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I
With the publication of Days of Obligation and, more recently, Brown,
Richard Rodriguezs scholarship has begun to recognize the theoretical 
import inherent in the Hispanic writers autobiographical essays. Juan de 
Castro most clearly makes this point as he states that [t]oday, like Gloria 
Anzaldúa or José David Saldívar, Rodriguez can be classiÞ ed as a theorist 
of the borderlands (102). This positive assessment of Rodriguez concerns 
mainly his two latest works which are often read as representing a radical 
rupture with his Þ rst autobiographical essay, Hunger of Memory.1 In what 
follows I take de Castros assessment of Rodriguez as a theorist seriously 
by uncovering the theory of borderland identities, which I consider to be 
already implicit in his Þ rst and most controversial book.2 More precise-
ly, I compare Rodriguezs epistemology of in-between identities with the 
theory of subjectivity advocated by the French feminist poststructuralist 
philosopher and psychoanalyst, Luce Irigaray in This Sex Which Is Not One. 
If on the one hand, Hunger of Memory can be read as a literary text with the-
oretical implications, then on the other hand, Margaret Whitfordone of 
Irigarays most informed American criticsafÞ rms that we should treat 
Irigarays work as literature (23).3 By cross-reading these two literary/
theoretical texts I begin to delineate the points of divergence and the points 
of convergence of two epistemic models of subjectivity. Put differently,
Rodriguez and Irigarays theoretical opposition and proximity, I will argue, 
can be found at the complex intersection between literature and theory. 
Thus, implicit in this double-reading strategy is an attempt at once to theo-
rize and to interpret. 
 It should Þ rst be noted that Rodriguezs Hunger of Memory is based 
upon epistemic, cultural, and political premises that are inimical, if not
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antithetical, to those articulated by Luce Irigarays in This Sex Which Is 
Not One. In fact, Rodriguezs stand against bilingual education is con-
sistent with his argument in favor of the necessity of assimilation (26) 
of ethnic minorities to the totalizing unity which is implicit in Ameri-
can national identity. His theoretical premises are grounded upon what 
Irigarayspeaking from the perspective of sexual rather than racial iden-
titydeÞ nes as the domination of the philosophic logos which reduce[s] 
all others to the economy of the Same (This Sex, 74). Irigarays theoretical 
position counters the theory of identity implicit in Rodriguezs autobiog-
raphy. In fact, speaking from the opposite side of the spectrum, Irigaray 
promotes a conception of the subject rooted in difference and multiplicity 
which resists assimilation to the hegemonic (patriarchal) order. Brieß y put, 
if Rodriguezs promotion of assimilation betrays a desire for sameness, 
Irigaray advocates a desire for otherness (This Sex, 130). 
 What is at stake in the confrontation of the Chicano writer and the 
radical feminist is a clash of theoretical perspectives concerning the sub-
altern subject as well as its problematic relation to both sameness and 
difference. And in what follows I begin to explore the generative tensions 
arising from this theoretical clash. More precisely, I consider Rodriguez 
and Irigarays economies of sameness and difference that sustain their 
conceptions of identity, in order to initiate a dialogue between these two 
thinkers. This confrontation will Þ rst allow me to point out the limitations 
inherent in Rodriguezs epistemology of sameness and, subsequently, 
to tease out the radical conclusions that are glimpsed, rather than taken 
hold of, in his Þ rst autobiography; while, at the same time, indicating the 
limits of Irigarays radicalism. In brief, I will begin to open up a space 
of inquiry concerning in-between subjectivity by articulating the episte-
mologies of sameness and difference that informs Hunger of Memory 
and This Sex Which Is Not One. Finally, this cross-reading will allow me to 
nuance the dichotomic tendency inherent in criticism which tends to con-
sider Rodriguezs Þ rst book as either neoconservative or progressive and 
This Sex as either essentialist or anti-essentialist.4 Thus, if Henry Staten has 
convincingly argued that Hunger is situated at the complex intersection 
of a both-and and a neither-nor (104), I will argue that the complexity of 
this intersection, which accounts for the multiplicity of voices at play in 
these texts, continues to unfold if we consider the relative points of con-
vergence and divergence between these two theoretical/literary texts and, 
as it were, use the two texts to unlock each other.
II
Rodriguezs promotion of cultural assimilation is grounded upon a di-
chotomic logic which sets the private and public spheres in a relation 
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of mutual exclusion. His political argument seems straightforward: in or-
der to assimilate to the hegemonic culture, ethnic minorities in the U.S. 
need to disavow what the author uncritically deÞ nes as their private 
individualit[ies] (26) with all they entail (i.e., native tongue, familial 
intimacy, cultural origins, ethnic and class bonds). This dichotomic un-
derstanding of identity formation is articulated around an image that is 
key to the shaping of Rodriguezs sense of selfhood in the U.S.: [O]utside 
the house was public society he writes; inside the house was private. 
Just opening or closing the screen door behind me was an important 
experience (1617). For the moment sufÞ ce it to say that Rodriguezs di-
chotomic logic is structured around the trope of the screen door. This 
image introduces a rupture, or discontinuity, between what the author 
perceives as two incompatible spheres: the private world of familial in-
timacy conveyed through Spanish and the public world of education 
based on English. Thus, for Richard the protagonist, the process of open-
ing and closing the door involves an articulation of identity upon two 
dichotomic and contradictory poles.5 Speaking of the difÞ culty of coordi-
nating two different languages Rodriguez states: It is not healthy to hear 
such sounds so often (17). According to Rodriguezs identity politics, in 
order to avoid a schizophrenic split, the in-between subject is forced to sac-
riÞ ce the difference inherent in the private sphere for the sameness 
which characterizes what José David Saldívar has called the homogene-
ity of U.S. nationalism (Border, ix). That is to say, he/she needs to choose 
between inside and outside, Spanish and English, private and 
public individuality. Thus, it seems, on the surface at least, that inherent 
in the trope of the screen door is a fundamental closure to the private 
sphere, since the subject cannot sustain the psychic transition from the 
private to the public sphere and vice versa. [T]he screen door shut behind 
me as I left for school (39), writes Rodriguez, and since his autobiogra-
phys subtitle is The Education of Richard Rodriguez, it could be inferred 
that the screen doors closure is deÞ nitive6 and that a unique telos drives 
this narrative. Finally, it appears to follow that according to Rodriguez, no 
sense of (an American) identitywhich he understands according to its 
etymological meaning, from Latin identitas, the samecan be grounded 
on two antithetical poles.
 The image of the screen door is instrumental in articulating the funda-
mental twoness of the in-between subject in the U.S.an aspect which 
both Rodriguezs political stand in favor of assimilation (i.e., Americaniza-
tion) and the either/or logic that sustain his narrative fail to address. Our 
understanding of the logic which underlies this image might improve if we 
compare it to Irigarays conceptualization of the vagina and the two-
ness inherent in it. Both theoretical models, in fact, share a concern with an 
articulation of what Irigaray calls the subjects multitude of selves (17): 
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that is, a subject which, as Irigarays puts it, is at least two (26). And I con-
sider this consideration of a subject that is at least two as a key point of 
anchorage that provisionally links these two authors across the theoretical 
abyss that divides them. However, before initiating a dialogic relationship 
between Rodriguez and Irigaray it is necessary to make a few preliminary 
remarks to clarify the speciÞ city of each approach. First, Hunger of Memory 
is a literary text, and the theory of identity that informs it calls for a her-
meneutic effort since it is not entirely explicit. This Sex Which Is Not One is 
a theoretical textalbeit a peculiar one since at times theory and Þ ction 
are conß atedwhich deals directly with a reconÞ guration of female sub-
jectivity. Second, Rodriguez deals with the articulation between the public 
and private spheres starting from the case of an ethnic minority in the U.S., 
whereas Irigaray focuses mainly (though not only) on the privacy of a so-
lipsistic female subject. The former is mostly concerned with the category 
of race, class, and ethnicity; the latter focuses on sexuality and gender re-
lations. Third, Rodriguezs autobiography is not explicitly representative 
(he says: I write of one life only. My own.), whereas Irigarays project is 
wider in scope and ambition since she attempts to (re)conceptualize the 
epistemic foundations of female subjectivity. Finally, if Rodriguez writes 
from within the hegemonic sphere, Irigaray situates herself at a distance 
from patriarchal conceptualizations of gender in order to take a critical 
stand towards the hegemonic culture.
 More speciÞ cally, the stakes inherent in This Sex Which Is Not One, 
a critique of psychoanalytic discourse on female sexuality, are already 
implicit in the title. On the one hand, Irigaray refers to the sexist concep-
tion of female sexuality inherent in the history of psychoanalysis: Freuds 
postulation that female sexuality is predicated upon a fundamental lack 
(the notorious penis envy) which deprives the female sexual organ from 
the status of being one. Thus, according to the French critic, psycho-
analysis reduces the female genital organ to less than one sex (a zero, 
a nothingness). On the other hand, her feminine language shows the 
capacity to displace the stability of the patriarchal ediÞ ce. You are right, 
our sex, is indeed not one, she seems to say, but two, three, or better, 
multiple. In a subversive move Irigaray turns lack into excess. The title, 
moreover, reveals an excess of meaning which mirrors the plurality and 
slipperiness of speaking (as) woman (parler femme). The two lips in con-
tinuous contact (24) which constitute the female genitals and account for 
the plurality of female sexuality also account for the plurality of mean-
ings inherent in feminine language (see 29). Irigarays slippery language 
conß ates genitalia and the mouth, anatomy and gender, femaleness and 
femininity. This strategic move allows her to dismantle the psychoana-
lytical focus on sameness (one sex) while promoting the difference 
(at least two) inherent in female sexuality. After these rough preliminary 
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remarks, sufÞ ce it to say that while being aware that Irigarays focus is 
limited to the sphere of gender and sexuality, I consider the theory that 
sustains her understanding of the female subject to be applicable to the 
category of subject tout court.7 Further, I believe that Irigarays critique 
of the a priory value [given]to Sameness (72) generatively intersects with 
Rodriguezs ambivalent relationship to the economy of sameness which 
informs his work. 
 After this brief and necessarily partial delineation of the speciÞ city 
of Irigarays project, it is not surprising that the radical feminist and the 
Hispanic writers epistemic models of subjectivity (i.e., the vagina and 
the screen door), appear to be antithetical. Rodriguezs conscious political 
stand in favor of assimilation (the doors closure on the private sphere) 
makes him complicit with the dominant ideology, whereas Irigarays resis-
tance to an economy of the Same is subversive of the dominant patriarchal 
order. The promotion of difference and multiplicity implicit in Irigarays 
theory of the subject is conÞ rmed if we consider her understanding of the 
female genitalia. Womans genitals she writes, are formed of two lips 
in continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she is already two (24). The 
image of the vagina is instrumental to promote a non-unitary vision of the 
subject. What follows is that Irigarays twoness, unlike Rodriguezs, is 
not predicated upon a violent division within the self which introduces 
a schizophrenic split, but rather on a contiguity between a multitude of 
selves (17). Furthermore, her focus is on womans ß uid character 
(109) as well as on the transgression and confusion of boundaries (106) 
that this ß uidity entails. If, on the one hand, Rodriguez seems to use the 
trope of the screen door in order to posit normative boundaries which 
delimit the identity of the minoritarian subject in the U.S., Irigaray, on 
the other hand, is concerned with the deconstruction of normative (i.e., 
patriarchal) limits imposed on the female subject. In brief, Irigarays va-
gina opens up intellectual space for the constitution of subjectivity that 
avoids the trap of identity predicated on sameness. According to Irigaray, 
the other is in fact always already within the female self.
III
With these theoretical considerations in mind I return to Hunger of Memory. 
The economy of sameness inherent in Rodriguezs identity politics and 
his commitment to an either/or logic are responsible for the teleological 
drive which sustains Rodriguezs narrative of social progress. In the ini-
tial lines of the book we read that his educational process leads him from 
the status of a socially disadvantaged child  to the one of a middle-
class American man. Assimilated (3). This movement leads the subject 
from childhood to adulthood; from alienation to assimilation; from 
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disadvantage to success. In brief, from negative to positive.8 As 
the author makes clear in the Þ rst chapter, this is [a]n American story 
(5) which depicts the realization of the American Dream. Rodriguezs 
Manichean logic justiÞ es the price to pay for success (45): since one can-
not become a public person while still remaining a private person (34), 
the achievement of success implies the disavowal of the in-between sub-
jects private individuality (26). Bluntly put, the destabilizing condition 
of inbetweenness structured upon the private/public binary opposition 
needs to be forsaken. This seems to be only a minor disadvantage since it is 
with pride that Rodriguez afÞ rms: I celebrate the day I acquired my new 
name (27): Rich-heard Road-ree-guess, the American subject, replaces 
Ricardo the Mexican subject; and, what ensues, to put it with Irigaray, is 
the promotion of a conception of identity predicated upon an economy of 
the Same which, in turn, sustains his stand in favor of cultural assimila-
tion and monolingual education.9 
 Informed scholars of Hunger of Memory have rightly criticized the ab-
soluteness of Rodriguez bipolar logic. Juan de Castro is to my knowledge 
the most recent critic (and probably not the last) who reiterates a point 
that had already received much attention as he denounces the rigidity of 
the public/private dichotomy (104); and Ramón Saldívar, in a pioneering 
article, logically concludes that because of this rigidity, or, as he puts it, 
because of the absolute separation between the private and the public 
Rodriguez posits, no dialectics develops between these two poles (Ide-
ologies, 27; my emphasis).10 Both critics are right insofar as we limit our 
reading to Rodriguezs explicit political program. However, it should also 
be noted that the fallacy inherent in such categorical readings is a tendency 
to read literary texts in sociological and political terms without paying 
close attention to the contradictory undercurrents at work in the texture 
of the text.11 And, if we look more closely at the textual forces at work 
in Hunger of Memory we shall see how the rigidity and absoluteness of 
Rodriguezs binary (political) thought begins to crumble and a dialectics 
of identity begins to develop. 
 The absoluteness of Rodriguezs either/or logic is already challenged 
by a closer examination of the screen door, the literary trope that structures 
the private/public dichotomy. We have already noted that the door estab-
lishes a rigid and static polarity between the inside and the outside. This 
move contrasts with Irigarays epistemic model based on continuity and 
ß uidity and justiÞ es de Castro and Saldívars criticism. What these critics 
do not note, however, is that the subject (the protagonist), articulates its 
sense of selfhood by moving between the private and the public sphere (i.e., 
by opening and closing the door) and, therefore, transgressing the frontier 
the author initially establishes. On the one hand, this movement between 
subject positions is reminiscent of Irigarays discussion of ß uidity and 
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transgression of boundaries. On the other hand, the logic that sustains 
Rodriguezs epistemic model is dialectical and based on a violent asym-
metry of power and a radical discontinuity of experiences which is foreign 
to Irigarays epistemic model (I will return to this important point). 
IV
Michel de Certeaus conceptualization of the frontier is useful to fur-
ther articulate some fundamental differences between Irigarays and 
Rodriguezs theoretical models. In fact, Rodriguezs screen door operates 
according to a logic that is reminiscent of what de Certeau has called the 
paradox of the frontier (127). Unlike Irigarays epistemic model which 
focuses on continuous contact only, the frontier has a paradoxical function 
because it both divides and unites. To put it with de Certeau, the frontier 
serves both as a barrier and a bridge since it is a place of disjunction 
and conjunction; separation and communication (127).12 Similarly, 
it can be said that the young Richard, by opening the door, introduces a 
continuity (conjunction) between the private and the public sphere which 
potentially allows for the inclusion of the public into the private and vice 
versa. However, as the two worlds are put in communication, he also soon 
realizes the incongruity and discontinuity (disjunction) existing between 
these two spheres. For Rodriguez, the process of opening the door, which 
puts the private and public sphere in contact, is simultaneous with the 
realization that these two worlds are incompatible (implicit in the door 
is neither simple disjunction nor simple conjunction, neither simple 
bridge nor simple barrier). Moreover, the moving subject soon dis-
covers that these two worlds are structured upon a severe asymmetry 
of power which makes the screen door a zone of uneasy and conß ictual 
contact. Rodriguezs identity politics reposes on a severe clash of perspec-
tives which confronts the absoluteness of his binary oppositions (i.e., the 
necessity of separation between private and public inherent in his po-
litical views) on the one hand, and the necessity to articulate and open 
up a space, through writing, in-between the two constitutive poles of his 
identity (i.e., the dialectical communication that Þ nely intertwines in the 
texture of Hunger) on the other hand. 
 Rodriguezs ambivalent attitude towards his private and public in-
dividuality results in the presence of two oppositional teleologies that 
underscore his narrative. On the one hand, an explicit and superÞ cial tex-
tual current displays Rodriguezs attempt to promote a vision of the subject 
predicated upon an economy of the Same. This current accounts for his 
stand in favor of monolingual education and cultural assimilation to the 
hegemonic order, and it leads the subject from the private to the public 
sphere; from the inside to the outside. On the other hand, it should also 
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be noted that Rodriguezs narrative, as the title suggests, is also grounded 
upon a nostalgic vision of the private sphere he disavowed. Commemo-
rating the lost world of intimacy Rodriguez writes: Boyhood memories 
beckoned, ß ooded my mind. (Laughing intimate voices. Bounding up the 
front steps of the porch. A sudden embrace inside the door.) (71) In these 
lines Hungers counter-telos is introduced: the subject is subjected to the 
ß ood of memories which, by pulling him inside the door, runs against 
the grain of Rodriguezs conscious project of social upwards mobility and 
cultural assimilation. According to this narrative vector, his autobiogra-
phy can be read as a mourning of the loss of his Mexican name, language, 
and cultural background. Thus, if Rodriguezs conscious promotion of 
Americanization takes him from the private to the public sphere and 
involves a closure on the latter, the hunger of memory which animates 
his textual project involves a return, through writing, from the public 
to the private world. Rodriguez tries to unlock the door he had once 
closed. This paradoxical double-teleology and the double narrative move-
ment that ensues have destabilizing textual (and political) implications. 
First, they trouble the linearity of Rodriguezs narrative of social prog-
ress. Second, they threaten to disrupt the boundaries between inside and 
outside, private and public, which the author consciously construes. 
Third, and most importantly, they challenge the unity and coherence of
Rodriguezs narrative voice. Finally, it should also be noted that the dis-
ruptive dimension inherent in Hungers ambivalent texture is not only 
destructive but also potentially empowering.
 The double movement (from private to public and vice versa) in-
herent in the texture of Rodriguezs text generates aporias that the author 
cannot fully control and that account for the radical implications inherent 
this text. Rodriguez writes: I evaded nostalgia. Tried hard to forget. But 
one does not forget by trying to forget. One only remembers (50). I sug-
gest that a similar tension is present in the narrative: a conscious political 
program which favors assimilation and sameness is constantly subverted 
by an underlying (i.e., unconscious) radical drive which restores differ-
ence to the surface. To put it in Freudian terms, Hunger of Memory can be 
read as the return of the repressed private sphere. The theoretical limita-
tions inherent in sociological and political criticisms that insists on the 
literalness of Rodriguezs reiÞ ed set of Þ xed polarities and promotion of 
assimilation is that they fail to consider what Judith Butler has called the 
critical dimension of the unconscious which, reemerges within the dis-
course of the subject as the very impossibility of its coherence (Gender, 
28).13 In other words, they only consider one telos and listen to only one 
of Rodriguezs narrative voices. Namely, to the voice of Richard the pro-
tagonist who strives to achieve a new sense of individuality predicated 
upon public identity and signiÞ ed by the Americanization of his Þ rst name 
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(Rich-heard)Rodriguezs political agenda approximates this position. 
The other, more dissident voice, which these critics fail to hear, is linked to 
Rodriguez the writer who, having ventured outside in the public world of 
education and having achieved the American Dream, realizes that his is 
an odd success (44). He is forced to confront the return of the repressed 
private sphere signiÞ ed by his Mexican name (Ricardo). 
 It must be noted that if Rodriguezs autobiography obviously neces-
sitates a Þ rst person narration, the reader should be careful not to conß ate 
the contradictory voices at play in this text under the monolithic signiÞ er 
of the authors name. What is challenged in Hunger of Memory is precisely 
such unitary and coherent conception of the subject. To put it in Irigarays 
terms, the subject of Hunger is not identical with [him]self (111) (pas 
identique à soi), and therefore, like Irigarays woman, his identity is not 
one. The ambivalence of Rodriguezs narrative voice testiÞ es to it and 
so do the contradictory responses this text has generated (I will return 
to this point, see n16). In this respect, since his narrative is oriented in 
two opposed directions, Rodriguezs can be seen as an (at least) Janus-
faced narrator who says the most contradictory things. Furthermore, 
Rodriguezs voice can be compared to what Irigarays says of parler femme, 
which involves a voice that overß ows the subject (une voix qui déborde 
le sujet) (112). Implicit in the notion of débordement (literally going over 
the borders) is a transgression of limits due to an excess of meaning, which 
very much applies to Rodriguezs transgression of the conceptual borders 
he initially posits.14 The Þ rst task of a rigorous reading of Hunger, it seems 
to me, is to disentangle this excess of meaning by identifying who is speak-
ing at a given moment in the text and from which narrative position. More 
precisely, this involves tracing the texts untidy intermixture of voices and 
their contradictory interactions.15
V
The two dissonant voices I am tracing can be deÞ ned in terms of what 
Stuart Hall has inß uentially called a struggle around positionalities 
(92). That Þ ctive unity which is Rodriguezs literary persona occupies at 
least two places at once. To put it in a simplistic and schematic way, Rich-
heard the assimilationist is positioned on the private side of the door and 
dreams of the public side, whereas the other, more dissident Rodriguez 
is positioned outside the door and attempts, through writing, to unlock 
the door of memory in order to let Ricardo speak.16 The radical dimension 
of the book arises from those moments in the text where Rich-heards con-
scious political program is subverted by the return of Ricardo (Irigarays 
other within the self, see This Sex, 28). This other comes back to un-
settle the narrative and, as Caliban would say, to claim his share in the 
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run of this isle (3). It is to the unconscious critical dimension and to its 
dialectical articulation with the conscious discourse of the subject (i.e., 
Rodriguezs political agenda) that I now turn. 
 Hunger of Memory is predicated upon a constant transgression of the 
screen door that divides private and public life. Hence, despite the au-
thors conscious attempt to construe his narrative upon an economy of 
samenessassimilation functioning as a guarantor of a coherent and har-
monic notion of selfhoodthe subjects transgression of identity borders 
involves a schizophrenic rupture within both selfhood and narrative. Such 
a rupture is already implicit in the autobiographys very Þ rst lines: I have 
taken Calibans advice, writes Rodriguez, I have stolen their books. I will 
have some run of this isle. (3). Rodriguezs reference to The Tempest allows 
him to play on the ambiguity upon which his own narrative and self are 
construed. In fact, if on the one hand Rodriguez identiÞ es with Caliban 
and the subjugated position he occupies, on the other hand he establishes 
a relationship of continuity with the foremost authority in English litera-
ture in order to justify and insure his position within the realm of Western 
culture.17 The direct parallel is with a subject subjected to the hegemonic 
order, and yet the indirect correlation with Shakespeare puts Rodriguez in 
the position of mastery over language which Caliban lacks. In other words, 
already in these initial lines, the author introduces different possibilities 
for social and psychic identiÞ cation so as to suggest that his relationship 
with the private/Mexican/subjugated side of his identity and the public/
American/dominant one is at best ambivalent. In short, he is both slave 
(Caliban) and master (Shakespeare) and yet, neither fully slave, nor fully 
master. Rodriguezs in-between position is based on a potentially desta-
bilizing tension generated by two (ant)agonistic sites of identiÞ cations. 
The constitution of his literary and non-literary self involves a constant 
negotiation between these conß icting identiÞ catory sites.18
 The complexity inherent in Rodriguezs multiple and conß icting iden-
tiÞ cationswhat Butler would call Rodriguezs identiÞ catory ß uidity 
(Bodies, 99)unfolds as we linger more on the implications of the authors 
identiÞ cation with Caliban, while keeping in mind the contextual bipolar 
logic that informs the narrative as a whole. The author makes clear that it is 
through languageand, more speciÞ cally, written, cultivated language
that he assumes a position of agency. However, the medium he uses to 
afÞ rm himself is not originally his, and upon this paradox pivots Hunger 
of Memory. The project that underscores the whole narrative is here encap-
sulated in a nutshell: how can Rodriguez make their books his own, in 
order not only to have some run of an environment which is inimical to 
his cultural origins, but also to gain control over the deÞ nition of himself? 
In other words, his identiÞ cation with Caliban and the transgressive act 
of stealing, implies agency and a subversion of the dominant order; and 
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yet, at the same time, Rodriguez remains radically dependent on and com-
plicit with the hegemonic values. José David Saldívar, makes this point as 
he says that paradoxically, [Rodriguez] pretends to join Calibans school 
of cultural resistance while the dominant U.S. literary public has by now 
legitimated his work (Dialectics, 136). And he resolves this paradox by af-
Þ rming that Rodriguez is not a Caliban protagonist; rather, he has become, 
in Renato Rosaldos words, an icon of collaboration with the English only 
movement and the conservative right wing (Dialectics, 137).19 This criti-
cism is partially right insofar as we listen to the textual voice of Rich-heard 
the assimilationist: a docile subject who uncritically and passively swallows 
the canonical books of the school of Prospero (i.e., the dominant culture). 
However, as pointed out, the linguistic forces that traverse Hunger are far 
from being unilateral and allow for the simultaneous ß ow of contradictory 
movements. In brief, the text undermines an either-or logic which allows 
critics to easily place Rodriguez either on the side of subversion (Caliban), 
or on the side of the dominant, conservative order (Prospero).20
 The underlying ambivalence and complexity inherent in Rodriguezs 
in-between subject positions unravel further as we return to the autobi-
ographys beginning and carefully disentangle the contradictory double 
movement which animates it. Once upon a time, he writes, I was a
socially disadvantaged child. An enchantedly happy child. Mine was 
a childhood of intense family closeness. And extreme public alienation. 
Thirty years later I write this book as a middle-class American man. Assim-
ilated.(3) The juxtaposition of the fairy tale-like incipit and the crudeness 
of social reality generate a tension which parallels the one between private 
and public sphere. The world of childhood, happiness, and intimacy, char-
acteristic of the private world as well as of fairy tales, is undermined by the 
social (public) reality which surrounds it. Moreover, despite the fact that this 
is a typical American story (7) insofar as it depicts the climbing of the lad-
der of social progress and the achievement of the American Dream (the 
fairy tale come true), the structure of Rodriguezs argument undermines 
his dichotomizing (Manichean) tendency. In fact, the socially disadvan-
taged childhood which characterizes the authors private sphere is not 
immediately dismissed according to a purely materialistic perspective (no-
tice the quotation marks as a signiÞ er of a certain degree of distance from 
the values characteristic of the hegemonic order). Rodriguez makes clear 
that his private sphere was only (if at all) materially inferior to his pres-
ent middle-class American status. If the movement is from childhood to 
adulthood; from social disadvantage to middle class; it should be speciÞ ed 
that an inversion of perspectives concerning the private and public spheres 
also takes place. In fact, the narrative of social progress turns family close-
ness into family alienation and public alienation into what could be 
ironically deÞ ned as public closeness (i.e., an oxymoron for Rodriguez).21
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Further, the speaking subject writes from a position of otherness, or alien-
ation, with respect to his earlier self. The temporal distance (thirty years have 
passed) introduces not only a gap between Rodriguez the child and Rodri-
guez the adult, but also between Rich-heard and Ricardo (with all the cultural 
implications these two names entail); the political ideologies that animate 
these two subjects should not too hastily be conß ated. In brief, the beginning 
already foreshadows the schizophrenic split that the image of the screen door 
introduces. Behind the reassuring tone that informs Hunger of Memorys Þ rst 
paragraph we already sense the problematic nature of this American hero 
and, most strikingly, we begin to hear the dissident voice of a minoritarian 
subject that undermines the hegemonic order from within. 
VI
The clash of narrative forces inherent in this text unfolds if we consider the 
second chapter entitled The Achievement of Desire. The double move-
ment I am tracing (the two vectors that take the subject away/towards the 
private sphere), Þ nds a condensed expression in the linguistic structure 
of this title. The ambivalence and slipperiness of the title is generated by the 
fact that, technically speaking, of desire is both objective and subjective 
genitive. Less technically, desire is on the one hand, what is achieved 
(objective genitive) (we will have to specify what this abstruse formulation 
might mean) and, on the other hand, what is responsible for the achieve-
ment (subjective genitive). More concretely, one way of understanding the 
Þ rst vector of Rodriguezs thought consists of considering Richard (Rich-
heard) the subject, who, endowed with agency, achieves the object of his 
desire: i.e., education. Thus, throughout the chapter, speaking of the books 
he read, Rodriguez states: I reported the achievement to a teacher and 
basked in the praise my effort earned (61), and later he would marvel at 
the breadth of [his] achievement (63). In this perspective, what is desired 
(i.e., education and the assimilation to the dominant order that ensues) 
seems to be achieved. This narrative movement supports the narrative 
of social success which takes the subject forward, towards the public sphere 
and parallels Rodriguezs promotion of cultural assimilation. 
 The linearity of this Þ rst telos is complicated if we consider that
Rodriguezs achievement reposes upon an identiÞ catory practice with 
the Þ gures he considers as embodiments of public culture. He states: I 
wanted to be like my teachers, possess their knowledge (55). It should be 
noted that Rodriguez does not want to establish a relationship of similar-
ity with his teachers (to be like them)this would imply a preservation 
of some individual characteristics, since a relationship of similarity, rig-
orously speaking, involves two different terms. Instead, identiÞ cation 
with his teachers concerns the young Rodriguezs whole sense of being
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(he wants to be like them). This identiÞ cation practice strips the subject of 
an independent sense of selfhood and, thus, radically undermines the very 
possibility of agency implicit in the notion of achievement. Rodriguez, 
following Richard Hoggart, calls the product of this unconditional identi-
Þ cation the scholarship boy: an imitative and unoriginal pupil (44). In 
other words, Rodriguezs attempt to accede to power via education corre-
sponds to a submission to the hegemonic order which produces a passive, 
empty subject. The authors voice, once again, seems to allude to the most 
contradictory things: On the one hand, implicit in the focus on achieve-
ment is a notion of agency which is necessary to sustain his narrative of 
social progress and assimilation (i.e., his political program). On the other 
hand, his description of the scholarship boy and the tone of the chapter 
make clear that the author is ironic with respect to his achievement. 
Finally, what is achieved is not so much education (and the successful as-
similation which education makes possible) but, rather, an empty subject 
animated by a state of permanent lack. Put differently, what the subject 
seems to achieve is a state of unsatisÞ ed desire responsible for the 
hunger that animates his writing.22
 The second possible interpretation concerning the voluntarily gram-
matical and semantic ambivalence of this title consists in considering 
desire as the subject of the sentence and achievement as its object.23 
According to this perspective, Rodriguez is subjected to his desire rather 
than being a subject who controls an intentional achievement. More pre-
cisely, Rodriguez tells us that desire does not lead the subject forward, 
towards assimilation, but rather backward towards the pasta movement 
which is consistent with the nostalgic mood of the chapter and the auto-
biography as a whole. The inversion of telos is apparent if we consider the 
last sentence of the chapter: 
It would require many years of schooling (an inevitable miseduca-
tion) in which I came to trust the silence of reading and the habit of 
abstracting from immediate experience . . . before I turned unafraid 
to desire the past, and thereby achieve what has eluded me for so 
longthe end of education. (73) 
Rodriguezs turn in order to desire the past consists of his Þ rst step 
towards a subversive identiÞ cation with Caliban. That is to say, he takes 
Calibans advice to steal the books of the dominant culture (an active and 
subversive act) in order to bend the language of the colonizer to his own 
purpose and, thus, like Caliban, rethink possibilities of subversion within the 
sphere of the hegemonic order. Inherent in this subversive desire for the past 
is both the end (i.e., the conclusion) of education known to the scholar-
ship boy (the end of imitation or miseducation) and, most importantly,
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a renewed understanding of the end (i.e., the goal) of education: namely, 
the shaping of the self on and against the hegemonic sphere.24  We begin 
to see that the radical ambivalence of Rodriguezs use of language is iso-
morphous with Irigarays parler-femme, since it allows for the construction of 
multiple and contradictory meanings and narrative movements. Both Rich-
heards desire, the scholarship boy who strives for public assimilation, and 
Ricardos, the Caliban Þ gure who turns his back on his scholastic achieve-
ment in order to desire the past, are at work in the grammatical structure 
of this title (and chapter). However, as the closure of the chapter makes clear, 
Rodriguez, at this moment in the text, privileges the turn to the past (the op-
posite of the teleology which he initially proposes). The difÞ culty of reading 
Hunger consists, among other things, not only of identifying who is speaking 
(with whom does Rodriguez identify at a particular moment in the text)25 but 
also of assessing the value and strength of this voice within its proper textual 
economy. In this light I suggest that this second chapter functions as a turn-
ing point where a forward looking desire turns into a past-oriented desire. 
The chapter comes thus to occupy an in-between position within Hungers 
textual economy as a whole: it functions as a crossroad where two vectors of 
desire diverge radically . This may account partially for the semantic ambiva-
lence of the title which approximates Irigarays deÞ nition of parler femme.
VII
If on the one hand Irigarays considerations of subjectivity are instrumen-
tal to tease out the multi-layered and polyphonic dimension of Hunger, on 
the other hand, Irigarays radicalism can in turn be nuanced in the light of 
the more subversive forces at work in Rodriguezs text. It should Þ rst be 
noted that the French theorists focus on the female body has predictably 
led to what Margaret Whitford calls a monolithic essentialist reading of 
Irigaray (16). Monique Plaza, one of the Þ rst to attack Irigaray on this 
ground, sums up the argument as she states that for the French radical 
feminist the potential existence of woman thus depends on the discovery 
of her essence, which lies in the speciÞ city of her body (quoted in Schor, 
6).26  What concerns me here is not so much the fact that Irigaray chooses 
to ground her epistemic model of the subject on the female genital organ, 
but rather the theoretical implications inherent in her epistemic model, 
and its functioning within its proper textual economy.27 Let us Þ rst notice 
that, for Irigaray, the focus of attention is not so much the anatomy but 
. . . the morphology of the female sex (qtd. in Burke 51). In other words, 
what matters, for the French philosopher, is the form or shape (Greek, mor-
phé) of her bodily schema, and not the fact that it is an anatomical model.
And it is with this theoretical warning in mind that I turn to (re)consider 
her epistemic model of subjectivity.
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 Implicit in the morphology of Irigarays schema, is a conscious eva-
sion of the violence and contradictions which sustain dialectical thought. 
In fact, Irigarays vulvomorphic logic (Gallop, 95) neither postulates 
a hierarchy between its constitutive poles, nor necessitates the presence 
of (sexual) otherness outside the (feminine) self. Thus understood, the 
feminine subject does not stem from a generative tension between self and 
other; inside and outside; subaltern subject and cultural hegemony.28 Put 
differently, the vaginal schema suggests that Irigarays concern with the 
subject takes place at the level of intra-subjectivity and does not address 
the problem of inter-subjectivity. Since the other is always already within 
the self, Irigaray does not need to articulate a space for the encountering of 
others outside the self, in the wider social sphere.29 In fact, negotiation of 
identity, for the French feminist, takes place within the private dimension of 
a kind of autoerotic desire that is highly suspicious of sexual difference.30 
 Moreover, despite Irigarays claim that woman is kept from disper-
sion because the other is already within her (31), the morphology of 
Irigarays epistemic model suggests that the contact between the two lips 
is not a contact with otherness but rather a symmetrical contact with an 
other that is the same. The articulation of what she calls a multitude of 
selves is not generated by an asymmetrical tension with otherness (and 
the pain it involves) but rather by a pleasurable contiguity with same-
ness. Irigaray, thus, speaks of a pleasurable contact predicated upon 
a nonsuture of [the] lips (30) which guarantees a space for the afÞ rma-
tion of the other in herself (28). If on the one hand Irigarays epistemic 
model promotes contact and continuity of identities, on the other hand 
what guarantees this continuity is a closure to and discontinuity with the 
cultural hegemony. Or, to put it in de Certeaus terms, the vagina ini-
tially appears to function as a bridge that connects. However, this bridge 
connects the subject with itself (i.e., with a sameness which is  inside the 
feminine subject) rather than with difference outside the self. Further, 
the morphology of the vagina also suggests that this model functions as 
a frontier or boundary that divides sexual sameness from sexual other-
ness by establishing the absoluteness of the gender/sexual divide.31 Rosi 
Braidotti, in her overall positive assessment of Irigaray, puts it even more 
crudely as she writes that Irigaray ends up upholding the metaphys-
ics of the sexual dichotomy masculine feminine (56). For our purpose, 
sufÞ ce it to say that implicit in the radical feminists theoretical model of 
subjectivity is a disavowal of the necessity of a severe confrontation with 
the hegemonic, phallocentric order.32
 The two lips which guarantee the multiplicity of female desire (30) 
as well as the multitude of selves which constitute woman are kept 
from dispersion insofar as they are rooted in the unity implicit in the mor-
phé of Irigarays epistemic model. Irigaray seems to involuntarily articulate 
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the theoretical implications of her model in her retelling of Carrolls Alice 
in Wonderland, The Looking Glass, from the Other Side, which functions 
as the Þ rst chapter of This Sex Which Is Not One: 
This story is coming to its end. Turning and returning in a closed space, an 
enclosure that is not to be violated, at least not while the story unfolds [Se 
tournant, et retournant, dans une enceinte qui ne sera pas transgressée, du 
moins pendant son déroulement]: the space of a few private properties. We 
are not going to cross a certain boundary line . . .  We have never been dealing 
with more than one, after all. A unity divided in halves.  (19)
This statement seems to match Irigarays conception of the vagina (i.e., 
of the subject): an impenetrable entity which is constituted in a closed, 
private space which ultimately can be deÞ ned as a unity divided in 
halves.33 In other words, despite the focus on multiplicity and difference, 
Irigarays textual unconscious seems to suggest that the model of the vagi-
na does not allow her to deal with more than one. Furthermore, crossing 
a certain boundary line, as Rodriguez does, implies a confrontation with 
difference and a necessary articulation of the boundaries of selfhood. This 
process, for Rodriguez, is not as pleasurable as it is for Irigaray because of 
the violence implicit in this crossing (in this sense Rodriguezs image of the 
screen door is closer to Gloria Anzalduas conceptualization of la frontera 
in terms of barbwire). Finally, despite Irigarays denouncement of both 
sameness and the Spaltung of the subject (two fundamental psychoanalyti-
cal pillars which also inform Rodriguezs understanding of identity) she 
seems to be unable to totally renounce these epistemic premises. 
 Despite my critique of Irigaray I want to stress that my task here is 
not to adjudicate between the Hispanic writer and the French theorists 
exemplary positions, but to try to understand and acknowledge the am-
bivalent texture that underscores these texts in order to account for their 
contradictory reception. And since Irigaray afÞ rms the necessity to pay 
attention to the way the unconscious works in each philosophy (75) I 
apply a hermeneutic of suspicion (Ricoeurs term) to both Rodriguezs 
text and Irigarays own philosophy. What I Þ nd is that Irigarays textual 
unconscious seems conservative if we compare it to the subversive textual 
dimension which animates Hunger. More precisely, Rodriguezs textual 
unconscious is subversive of the economy of sameness he consciously sets 
forth to promote, whereas behind the radicalism of Irigarays conscious 
political and philosophical radical agenda is an unconscious that, at cer-
tain textual moments, gestures towards an economy of the Same and, 
therefore, operates according to the logic she sets forth to criticize.
 And yet, in order to do justice to Irigarays thought it should also be 
noted that despite the theoretical implications inherent in her model of the 
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female subject and in her textual unconscious, Irigaray does not, a priori, 
preclude the possibility of a dialogue with sexual otherness. In fact, in an 
interview which functions as a chapter in This Sex she says: Speaking 
(as) woman [parler-femme] would, among other things, permit women to 
speak to men(136). However, in order for the possibility of parler-femme to 
develop, the female subject needs to bracket itself off from the economy 
of Sameness that, according to her, informs the hegemonic phallocentric 
order tout court. And it is on this key point that Rodriguezs understand-
ing of the twoness of the subject, and Irigarays, fundamentally diverge. 
According to Irigaray, the development of a dissident voice needs to grow 
on a soil that has not been contaminated by the dominant discourse. She 
justiÞ es the breaking away of women-among-themselves as strategi-
cally necessary (tactiquemet nécessaire) (16061). Hence, she suspends the 
possibility of a dialogue with sexual otherness until the female subject 
has constituted itself outside of the cultural hegemony. What follows is 
that (female) subjectivity, thus understood, is not constituted dialectically. 
In fact, she says that [r]ather than maintaining the masculine-feminine
opposition, it would be appropriate to seek a nonhierarchical articulation of 
that difference in language (162). According to Irigaray, it is in language 
that her utopia (literally, no place) can be produced, where difference can 
be articulated outside of hierarchical and dialectical binary oppositions. In 
this respect she remains true to her epistemic model, insofar as her empha-
sis on the two lips conß ates the female genitalia and the mouth; body and 
language.34 This conß ation, she seems to imply, is a necessary condition for 
the development of a kind of other, multi-layered, and ambivalent speech 
(parler femme) which attempts to transcend dialectical thought. 
VIII
Unlike This Sex, Hunger is structured upon a severe dialectical struggle 
where the subaltern side of Rodriguezs identity (Caliban the slave) 
functions as the negative pole upon which the success of the Ameri-
can master is construed. In fact, it is because Rodriguez cannot afford 
to admire his parents (49) that he is forced into a relationship of iden-
tiÞ cation with his teachers (the masquerade inherent in the scholarship 
boy). Academic and social success is predicated upon a violent dis-
avowal or repression which is both personal and cultural. Speaking of his 
last name Rodriguez writes: The name I carry from my parentswho 
are no longer my parents, in a cultural sense (4). Rodriguezs alienation 
from his parents involves his cultural afÞ liation to the realm of Western 
culture (his cultural father is no longer Caliban but Shakespeare). How-
ever, if this identity shift is represented by the Americanization of his Þ rst 
name (Rich-heard), he cannot discard his parental last name (Rodriguez) 
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and its cultural signiÞ cance (Caliban and Shakespeare coexist in one
subject). Further, the repressed returns to haunt both the subjects dreams 
of success and, more importantly, the hegemonic culture as a whole 
which created the necessity of repression in the Þ rst place. Hence the rev-
olutionary force inherent in this text, which, in Hegelian terms, could be 
deÞ ned as a linguistic Kampf auf Leben und Tod between private and public 
sphere; slave and master; Caliban and Shakespeare.
 The radical implications inherent in Hunger of Memory arise from its 
heros inability to resolve the fundamental psychic, cultural, and political 
Spaltung that informs his sense of what Irigaray would deÞ ne as an iden-
tity which is not one. In fact, despite Rodriguezs conscious articulation 
of an either/or logic which requires the disavowal of the private person-
ality, his autobiography depicts a subject which is simultaneously both 
American and Chicano and yet neither fully American (whatever that may 
be) nor fully Chicano.35 This state of suspension between what Rodriguez 
perceives as two metaphysical alternatives (inside vs. outside) contributes 
to create what he calls a comic victim of two cultures (5). On the one 
hand, Rodriguez can be seen as a victim insofar as his cultural origins 
are found at the intersection of two poles, which, unlike Irigarays lips, 
generate a state of violent asymmetrical tension and, despite Rodriguezs 
emphasis on comedy, tear the subject apart. Thus, the dialectics of iden-
tity at work in Rodriguezs autobiography does not involve a deÞ nitive 
synthesis in which both poles can be successfully and harmoniously inte-
grated and reconciled into a coherent and unitary sense of identity (i.e., an 
identity that is the same). On the other hand, Rodriguez cannot be read 
as a passive victim only, insofar as he attempts, through writing, to open 
up an alternative space in-between the two dichotomic alternatives he ini-
tially posits. In this sense, the double-movement that animates Hunger can 
neither be read as an uncritical celebration of cultural assimilation only, 
nor as a nostalgic search for origins only, but rather as an attempt to cre-
atively articulate these two epistemological alternatives. The result is not 
a harmonious resolution of the conß ict of identity but a state of creative 
and painful suspension. It is thus signiÞ cant that the autobiographys clo-
sure is also not really one since no resolution occurs: Rodriguez, in the 
last pages of Hunger, Þ nds himself neither fully outside, nor fully inside 
the house (the door neither fully open nor totally closed) but rather on the 
threshold, caught up in-between the two spheres he initially so rigidly 
posited. In brief, at the end of the his Þ rst book he places himself precisely 
at that intermediate in-between position which in later writings he will 
come to embrace and celebrate.36
 Rodriguezs tendency to fall back onto an economy of sameness (i.e., 
his critique of bilingual education and promotion of Americanization) can 
now be (re)read as an attempt to counter the more revolutionary forces 
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at work in the text. These forces constantly displace the subject from a 
position of (public) stability and threaten to disrupt the coherence and 
unity of his sense of public individuality. Furthermore, Rodriguezs pro-
motion of monolingualism does not concern only him as a subject, but 
also mirrors a national unease in dealing with the slipperiness and insta-
bility which characterizes in-between subjectivities. Rodriguezs critique 
of bilingual education reveals the complexity inherent in both his and 
the bilingualists identity politics. Notice that his critique of bilingualists 
is counterintuitive insofar as he points out their inability to adequately 
engage with the problem of inbetweenness and the unstable cultural 
position that pertains to it. He writes: Perhaps because I am marked by 
indelible color they [white American bilingualists] easily suppose that I 
am unchanged by social mobility, that I can claim unbroken ties with my 
past (5). Rodriguezs theoretical move is subtle: he relegates advocators 
of bilingual education to an epistemology of sameness based on a kind 
of ethnic, or even worse, racial essentialism which freezes the in-between 
subject within the restrictive conÞ nes of his cultural origins signiÞ ed by 
his skin color. Rodriguez dispels the exotic connotation which his origins 
may have: Aztec ruins hold no special interest for me (5). He claims 
that his cultural (Mexican) origins do not provide a solid ground for the 
establishment of his identity borders and, thus, moves away from a purist 
notion of racial and ethnic authenticity.37
 And yet, if on the one hand, Rodriguez accuses his political oppo-
nents of proposing the possibility of the existence of unbroken ties 
with his past, on the other hand, he seems to fall into the same trap by 
going too far in the opposite direction in afÞ rming the univocal aspect of 
his new cultural origins: he uncritically considers his autobiography an 
American story (5).38 The centripetal forces inherent in this claim of a 
unitary origin (i.e., the vector that takes the subject away from the private 
sphere) are also responsible for Rodriguezs (mis)understanding of bilin-
gual education. He writes: It is not possible for a childany childever 
to use his familys language in school (12). The force of his argument 
seems irrefutable. In fact, Rodriguezs claim is not limited to bilingual chil-
dren (he addresses any child). However, by broadening the scope of his 
critique he reveals the epistemic bias upon which his political argument 
is predicated. In fact, Rodriguezs argumentative force stems from a rhe-
torical (rather than conceptual) move which deftly conß ates language and 
language use. The difference is key. In fact, if anglophone children entering 
the sphere of education need to operate a shift from private to public 
English (a shift within two different uses of the same language), there is 
no reason to believe that the very same shift cannot be operated by bilin-
gual children concerning two languages. In Rodriguezs case, the Spanish 
spoken at home would necessarily be different from the Spanish spoken at 
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school; and yet it would still be Spanish. The mastery of the native tongue 
would in turn allow the in-between subject to access not only the private 
sphere of family relationship (Rodriguez could thus speak to his grand-
mother and would have a word to address his father, i.e., papà), but also 
the wider culture to which these relationships are linked. In brief, bilingual 
education would give the in-between subject the possibility of addressing 
her/his private individuality (one of the two cultures Rodriguez speaks 
of) from the perspective of meaning rather than feeling only.39 Put different-
ly, mastery of two linguistic codes would facilitate the in-between subjects 
confrontation with the ambivalence of her/his identity. Starting from an 
egalitarian position (a mastery of two codes) seems a necessary condition 
for a reduction of the violent hierarchy between private and public and 
for the ability to operate what Irigaray would call, having Alice in mind, a 
playful crossing (77) between two different worlds. 
IX
Rodriguezs difÞ culty in consciously elaborating on a language to address 
his cultural twoness, mirrors not only an individual problem as his af-
Þ rmation, I write of one life only. My own (7) might suggest, but also a 
wider, national uneasiness with inbetweenness. In fact, as I have noted, 
Rodriguez functions not so much as a subject who is in control of his sense 
of identity, but rather, as one who is subjected to wider sociopolitical forces. 
The narrative has nonetheless radical implications since, in depicting the 
contradictions inherent in one speciÞ c American subject, the economy
of sameness inherent in American identity politics (one nation, one lan-
guage, one God) is exposed. Rodriguez, unlike Irigaray, challenges the 
epistemic and political privilege of sameness from within the hegemonic 
order; moreover, he does so by embracing a dialectical logic and by speak-
ing from both the position of master and slave (though only through 
the linguistic code of the master). The politically disruptive nature of
his narrative arises from the generative tension inherent in both his torn 
psyche and body and in its textual articulation. In fact, the double ten-
sion inherent in Rodriguezs Hunger of Memory deconstructs his conscious 
subscription to an economy of Sameness (included in his critique of
bilingualism). More precisely, the process of conscious construction 
and unconscious deconstruction initiates a syncopated movement that
threatens to disrupt the epistemology of sameness that grounds both
Rodriguezs sense of private and public identity. Further, this desta-
bilizing, unresolved, back and forth movement challenges the unitary 
conceptions of personal and national identity. Rodriguezs involuntary 
radicalism stems from the in-between space opened up by this contradic-
tory movement. 
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 Unlike Irigarays conception of the vagina, Rodriguezs image of 
the screen door is articulated upon two poles that create a state of gen-
erative tension. On the one hand, the presence of a tension can be read 
as the actual proof that an articulation between self and other; sameness 
and difference is taking place. And in this sense, Rodriguezs dialectics 
of identity appears to be closer to the painful social reality implicit in the 
condition of in-betweenness. However, by discarding the possibility of an 
articulation between self (inside) and an other (outside), Irigaray avoids 
the fallacy of violence implicit in dialectical thinking, and opens up an al-
ternative space for the articulation of female subjectivity in language. This 
concern with a different use of language, and the plurality of voices that 
are allowed to speak through it, I have attempted to show, can serve as a 
provisional link between Irigaray and Rodriguezs concern with a subject 
that is always at least two. In fact, despite the two authors apparent 
endorsement of two conß icting economies, with respect to language use 
they both seem to promote a kind of writing which allows for the expres-
sion of different and contradictory voices. Disentangling them is already a 
literary effort with political implications in itself.
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
NOTES
1. In Border Matters José David Saldívar, after positively assessing Days of Obliga-
tions in terms of an autoethnographic borderland text (12) goes on to point out 
that Rodriguezs second book is everything that Hunger of Memory was not (146) 
and speaks of a sea change in Rodriguezs worldview (146); see also 144, 14647, 
151. De Castro, in a similar spirit, afÞ rms that Rodriguez, in one of the essays that 
would later appear in Brown, has evolved towards a celebration of hybridity 
(116) which involves a going beyond the binary opposition that characterized 
Hunger of Memory (119). Within the scope of this essay I cannot fully address the 
question of the continuity/discontinuity of Rodriguezs work, since that would 
imply a careful consideration of his three autobiographical essays. I do, however, 
begin to sketch a genealogy of his concern with hybridity.
2. For a representative sampling of other critics who implicitly or explicitly 
acknowledge the conceptual/theoretical value of Hunger of Memory, see Randy
A. Rodríguez, 398; Norma Alarcón, 150; Henry Staten, 104; and Gustavo Peréz 
Firmat, 258. These insightful readings, however, are not primarily concerned with 
the promotion of Rodriguez as a theorist, which I take to be my focus.
3. Whitford also recognizes that greater attention is now being paid to the 
status of Irigarays writing as text, that is to say, writing that employs rhetorical 
devices and strategies. (16) In what follows I pay attention to both the explicit 
theoretical/conceptual import of the two texts under consideration and to their 
literary devices and strategies. 
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4. For a detailed account of the reception of Rodriguezs work until 1998, see Randy 
A. Rodríguez, n6, 412; n7, 41314; for an informed delineation of the historical reso-
nance of this debate and its relationship with chicanismo, see Henry Staten, 10408. 
I will return to the question of Irigarays essentialism below. Since both Hunger and 
This Sex have elicited strikingly oppositional readings, I hope their cross-reading will 
contribute to an at least partial clariÞ cation of the ambivalence inherent in the texture 
of these texts which, in turn, can begin to account for their ambivalent receptions.
5. Mimi Sheller and John Urrys excellent sociological discussion of the private/
public divide emphasizes the multi-layered and complex dimensions inherent in 
this binary. Moreover, they point out that there is a tendency in existing literature 
to think in terms of [private and public] spheres or spaces, concepts that are 
often static and regional in character, and they add: We criticize such static 
conceptions and emphasize the increasing ß uidity in terms of where (or when) 
moments of publicity and privacy occur (108). It should be noted that in this essay 
I do refer to the private/public distinction since it is at the heart of Rodriguezs 
argument. However, my references to the public and private sphere should 
always be taken, as it were, in intonational quotation marks. In fact, as it will pro-
gressively become clear, I do not intend to posit a metaphysical barrier between 
the two worldsa gesture which would naïvely replicate Rodriguezs political 
move (Tomás Riveras reading of Hunger is representative of such criticism; see his 
metaphysical equations: ser = private and estar = public). Instead I set forth to show 
how these two spheres interpenetrate each other with respect to speciÞ c cultural 
aspects which are determined by the narrative, such as language, education, and 
family bondage. In other words, my focus is on the mobility of the subject and the 
way it undermines the stability of this binary. With respect to the inside/outside 
binary, my approach is most clearly formulated by Diana Fuss: The Þ gure inside/
outside she writes cannot be easily or ever Þ nally dispensed with; it can only be 
worked on and worked overitself turned inside out to expose its critical operations 
and interior machinery (Fuss, Inside/Out, 1; my emphasis).
6. In an insightful essay, Gustavo Pérez Firmat also focuses on the trope of the 
screen door and comes to this conclusion: Rodriguez imagines [the screen door] 
as a protective barrieropaque rather than transparent, occlusive rather than 
permeable (260). Subsequently, Firmat contrasts Rodriguezs screen door to the 
sliding-glass-door of Californian middle-class families (see Hunger, 179) which, 
according to him connects rather than isolates (Firmat, 261). While I sympa-
thize with this reading, I consider Rodriguezs screen-door less impermeable 
than Firmat wants it to be (see below). 
7. José Esteban Muñoz points out that [c]ultural studies of race, class, gender, 
and sexuality are highly segregated (8). And cultural critic Jonathan Dollimore 
adds that [t]heories of sexual difference notoriously disregard the erotics of other 
kinds of difference (Desire, 17). My intersectional reading is a modest attempt 
to trouble the rigidity of theoretical disciplines while, at the same time, delineating 
the speciÞ city of each theoretical approach.
8. Here I exploit the moral connotation of these terms. Below I begin to consider 
their dialectical implications. 
9. Early critics of Hunger of Memory linger at length on the (neo)conservative 
dimension of Rodriguezs political views and his uncritical adoption of the values 
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of dominant culture which they take to be inherent in his celebration of assimila-
tion and monolingual education for minorities in the U.S. For a representative 
sampling of this criticism, see Rivera, 710; Romero, 96; R. Saldívar, 1985:26; Flores, 
86; J. D. Saldívar.
10. R. Saldívar restates the same point as he speaks of Rodriguezs undialectical 
opposition between self and society (Ideologies, 33).
11. This theoretical tendency has been severely denounced by Rodriguez in an 
interview: I think that it is the worst example of the politicization of ethnic litera-
ture, now that it is read more as sociology. Sociology is not literature (Violating, 
42930). In his last book, Brown, he restates the same point: The liberal-hearted who 
run the newspapers and the university English departments and organize the book-
stores have turned literature into well-meaning sociology (Brown, 39). It should be 
noted that Rodriguezs autobiographies are obviously political and seem to ask for 
a sociopolitical reading. However, the political implications inherent in his work, 
Rodriguez seems to suggest, need to be uncovered via a hermeneutic effort. 
12. De Certeau adds that the frontier is created by contacts since the points 
of differentiation between two bodies are also their common point (127). This 
accounts for the paradoxical fact that the frontier, like the door, is a site of both 
opposition and proximity. In fact, as Jonathan Dollimore remarks, [t]o be against 
(opposed to) is also to be against (close up, in proximity to) or, in other words, up 
against (qtd. in Uebel, 8).
13. In this instance Butler speaks of the subversive potential of the unconscious 
as a site of repressed sexuality (28). However, as she makes especially clear in 
her later works, the disruptive power of the unconscious should not be understood 
exclusively in sexual (i.e., Freudian) terms. 
14. Irigarays additional comments on parler-femme also seem to apply to Rodri-
guez: Woman she writes, never speaks the same way. What she emits is ß owing, 
ß uctuating. Blurring (112). We shall return below to some speciÞ c instance of what 
I consider to be Rodriguezs parler-femme.
15. I am indebted to Henry Statens deconstruction of Nietzsche (see Nietzsches 
Voice) for my approach to Hunger of Memory.
16. I hasten to add that the extent to which Rodriguezs writing is a conscious 
and controlled act of subversion and the extent to which his unconscious speaks 
(ça parle) is a question that I cannot address. Moreover, Id like to make clear that 
I am painfully aware that my reading does not do justice to the complexity of the 
text, since there are indeed more than two voices speaking in Hunger, as Rodri-
guezs paradoxical deÞ nition of himself as a queer Catholic Indian Spaniard 
already implies (Brown, 35). I recur to this (over)simpliÞ cation because it allows 
me to begin to address the contradictory political reactions this text has elicited.
R. Saldívar explains this fundamental paradox as he states that Rodriguez choos-
es to market his existential anguish to the most receptive audience imaginable: the 
right-wing establishment and the liberal academic intelligentsia (Chicano, 158). 
Saldívar chooses to explain the textual ambivalence in purely economic terms. 
The text, thus understood, is a commodity among others produced in order to
appeal to the maximum number of consumers (Randy A. Rodríguez, in an ex-
tensive endnote, has convincingly shown the weakness of this reading, see n.6, 
412). On the other hand, I propose to inverse Saldívars causal model. In fact, I 
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consider the multiplicity of contradictory voices at work in Hunger as an expres-
sion of Rodriguezs complex social and psychic organization. To put it even more 
clearly, the reception of the book is mixed because Rodriguez has mixed feelings; 
and Rodriguez has mixed feelings because he is subjected to (rather than subject 
of) contradictory ideological and emotional forces. R. Saldívar, on the one hand, 
is deeply aware that Chicano narrative, as he puts it, attempts to reveal the 
ideological structures by which we continue to create the world (Chicano, 9).
And yet, he fails to apply his theoretical insights to his reading of Hunger. Speak-
ing of the shame he feels for his parents and the guilt that ensues Rodriguez says: 
I felt such contradictory feelings. (There is no simple roadmap to the heart of
the scholarship boy). What is true for the subject is true for the text. Rodriguezs 
complex social and psychic organization is the product of the oppositional ide-
ological pressures that are exerted on him as an in-between subject and which
he attempts to give shape to and map through writing (hence the two contradic-
tory teleologies I am tracing). It should be noted that Rodriguezs textual voices 
cannot easily be disentangled and, therefore, there is no simple roadmap which 
indicates those moments in the texts where a severe dialectics takes place. 
17. Rodriguezs strategic use of the trope of the middle class pastoral, which 
he adopts in the prologue  to frame his narrative, might be seen as serving a similar 
function. 
18. IdentiÞ cation, as psychoanalysis teaches us, is key for the formation of sub-
jectivity. In fact, Laplanche and Pontalis, following Freud, afÞ rm that [i]t is by 
means of a series of identiÞ cations that the personality is constituted and speci-
Þ ed (qtd. in Muñoz, 7). The question of identiÞ cation has recently been taken up 
again by gender theorists such as Diana Fuss and Judith Butler. Fuss writes that 
multiple identiÞ cations within the same subject can compete with each other, 
producing further conß icts to be managed . . . The history of the subject is there-
fore one of perpetual psychic conß ict. (IdentiÞ cation, 49; see also Butler, Bodies, 
99). Their focus on the (ant)agonistic and contestatory dimension of identiÞ catory 
practices Þ nds a concrete literary expression in Hunger. 
19. J. D. Saldívar is not alone to puzzle over Rodriguezs identiÞ cation with 
Caliban. Gustavo Pérez Firmat also states that [a]fter all, Rodriguez does not feel 
enslaved [as Caliban] but liberated by assimilation into North American culture 
(257). Firmat, in this instance, rushes over the complexity of the Rodriguez-Caliban 
identiÞ cation. In fact, like Saldívar, he uncritically listens to Rodriguez identity 
politics only, where assimilation and liberation are conß ated and, thus, he 
fails to fully grasp the relevance of these initial lines. In fact, Caliban is not only a 
Þ gure of enslavement, as Firmat seems to imply, but also of potential liberation 
(i.e., a liberation which has nothing to do with assimilation, but rather with the 
recuperation of memories). I suggest that enslavement and liberation are not 
necessarily contradictory terms for Rodriguez but rather correspond to different 
moments in the progression of his psycho-textual dialectic. 
20. Critics who, in their assessment of Hunger, rely on the absoluteness of the 
either-or dichotomy (either Caliban or Prospero) and who categorically afÞ rm, as 
R. Saldívar does, that Rodriguez must irrevocably choose between [the private 
and the public], [a]nd he does choose [i.e., the public] (Ideologies, 27), remain 
trapped in the very bipolar logic they are denouncing. 
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21. Renny Christopher considers the sense of loss that haunts upward mobil-
ity (80) in Hunger of Memory as a paradigmatic case of a type of literature which 
he deÞ nes as unhappy narratives of upward mobility (80). 
22. It is interesting to note that Rodriguezs deÞ nition of the scholarship boy in 
terms of imitation parallels Irigarays discussion of what she calls masquerade. 
Subjects who Þ nd themselves in masquerades writes Irigaray, are imported into 
another economy, where they are completely unable to Þ nd themselves. . . .  In 
the masquerade, they submit to the dominant economy of desire in an attempt to 
remain on the market in spite of everything (133). Both Rodriguez and Irigaray 
denounce this docile position. Furthermore, the scholarship boys desire to assimi-
late to the hegemonic order is highly reminiscent of Rodriguezs political argument 
in favor of assimilation; a parallel which discredits Rodriguezs political agenda. 
23. Notice Rodriguezs recurrent use of the ambivalent genitive structure (of 
desire, of education). This ambivalent formulation where subject and object 
cannot be easily distinguished is instrumental to generate an excess of contradicto-
ry meanings. Further, this ambivalent use of language openly etiolates the rigidity 
of Rodriguezs explicit dichotomic logic. It is, thus, interesting to note that this 
linguistic structure appears again in the subtitle of Rodriguezs last book, Brown. 
The Last Discovery of America, which has been praised for going beyond the binary 
oppositions that characterized Hunger of Memory (de Castro, 119). Rodriguezs 
ambivalent language in his Þ rst book already suggests that the binary oppositions 
are less stable than they Þ rst appear to be. 
24. Jonathan Dollimores discussion of the ambivalence of desire perfectly 
matches the conß icts of desires at stake in both this chapter and in the text as a 
whole. Desire, writes Dollimore, is always desire for something which is not 
yet; in that sense it is forward-looking, addressed to the future. But desire is also 
about the past and memory, and in that sense it is about going back (Sex, 36). 
25. With respect to identiÞ cation, Diana Fuss writes: We can thus economically 
summarize the difference between identiÞ cations as the difference between an ac-
tive and a passive relation to the Other: to seize the Other, or to be seized by the 
Other (IdentiÞ cation, 41). This fundamental distinction is useful to differentiate be-
tween Richards passive relation to education and Calibans active appropriation of 
the past. 
26. For an informed article which traces the genealogy of Irigarays reception 
within the frame of the essentialist/antiessentialist debate, see Schor. 
27. I am in agreement with Judith Butler as she deÞ nes Irigarays biological es-
sentialism in terms of a rhetorical strategy (Bodies, 151). My concern is thus 
to understand the functioning of Irigarays strategic essentialism. 
28. Rosi Bardotti also stresses the non-dialectical dimension inherent in Iriga-
rays theory of femininity: Sexual difference as a political practice, she writes, 
is constructed in a non-Hegelian framework whereby identity is not postulated 
in dialectical opposition to a necessarily devalorized other (46). In other words, 
Irigarays break with dialectics is necessary to promote a vision of sexual difference 
on a non-hierarchical framework. 
29. Monique Plaza makes a similar point as she states that according to Irigaray, 
the feminine essence of woman can only be discovered outside of the oppres-
sive social framework, that is to say, in the body of the woman (qtd. in Schor, 6).
 	
  
245Dissonant Voices in Richard Rodriguez and Luce Irigaray
While agreeing on the non-dialectical aspect of Irigarays model, I think that Plaza 
justiÞ es her charge of essentialism by focusing on the anatomy rather than the 
morphology of Irigarays epistemic model and, thus, simpliÞ es the question of 
Irigarays essentialism. Irigarays use of the signiÞ er woman and of the third- 
person feminine singular pronoun she has also predictably led to an accusation 
of essentialism. While my assessment of Irigaray leads to analogous conclusions, I 
differentiate myself from this anti-essentialist criticism by not limiting my critique 
of Irigaray to her reference to a bodily schema and to monolithic signiÞ ers such as 
woman or she. 
30. She writes: This autoeroticism is disrupted by a violent break-in: the bru-
tal separation of the two lips by a violating penis, an intrusion that distracts and 
deß ects the woman from this self-caressing she needs if she is not to incur the dis-
appearance of her own pleasure in sexual relations (24). The contact with sexual 
otherness, according to Irigaray, is necessarily violent and disruptive. Implicit in 
these lines is not only a refusal to engage in a dialogic relationship with the patri-
archal order outside the self, but also a fundamental closure to (sexual) difference 
and otherness which runs counter to Irigarays conscious promotion of an econ-
omy of difference. The promotion of a multiplicity of selves takes place, to put it 
with Rodriguez, within the private sphere only. If Rodriguez initially tries to Þ nd a 
sense of selfhood on the public side of the screen door, Irigaray Þ nds refuge on its 
private side. Implicit in her argument is an uneasiness to explore the inbetween-
ness of identity that is reminiscent of Rodriguezs identity politics. 
31. It is worth noting that this notion of limit or boundary, is already implicit 
in the etymology of the term morphology. In fact, as Heidegger reminds us, the 
Greek morphé corresponds to the enclosing limit and boundary, what brings and 
stations a being into that which it is, so that it stands in itself: its conÞ guration 
(qtd. in Staten, 1990, n.8, 130). Irigaray, the student of Greek philosophy, must have 
been aware of the etymology of the word, and it is therefore not surprising that 
her epistemic model of the vagina, understood according to its morphé, operates in 
isolation from an outside and promotes a conception of subjectivity that stands 
in itself.
32. I hasten to add that I do not mean to imply that Irigarays work as a whole 
does not confront the patriarchal order. Nothing could be farther from the truth as 
most chapters of This Sex and her other major philosophical work, Speculum Of The 
Other Woman, make clear. My point is limited to the theoretical conclusions which 
can be drawn from her epistemic model of the female subject.
33. Notice that the English word enclosure lacks the ambivalence inherent in 
the French term enceinte which also signiÞ es pregnancy. Thus, in the original, 
the link to the female body that must not be violated during pregnancy is more 
explicit (see also the reference to tournant and returnant as a possible allusion to 
the movement of a baby in the maternal womb). I will return to this ambivalent 
passage below, see n. 35.
34. In this light, Irigarays aforementioned quote (This story is coming to its end. 
Turning and returning in a closed space, an enclosure that is not to be violated, at least not 
while the story unfolds . . . ) acquires another signiÞ cance. Irigarays reference to a 
closed space which is also a unity divided in halves seems not only to allude to 
the privacy of the female genital organ but also to the morphology of the book, and 
 	
  
Nidesh Lawtoo246
most importantly, to the private act of writing. Inherent in this second reading 
of this ambivalent passage is a disruption of the boundary line that divides pri-
vate from public sphere; a move which strikingly approximates Rodriguezs 
understanding of writing as a lonely practice which is also, as he puts it, the most 
public thing [he has] ever done (176). In this respect, both writers seem to share a 
belief in written languages as a site of articulation for new possibilities of subjectiv-
ity. And yet their textual logic cannot be too easily conß ated. 
35. Henry Staten makes a similar point as he writes that Rodriguezs acute aware-
ness of the ironies of such cultural location (both-and, neither-nor) motivates his 
refusal to count himself as a Chicano (113). Irigarays deÞ nition of woman also seems 
to approximate Rodriguezs psychic condition: She is neither one nor two, she writes, 
rigorously speaking, she cannot be identiÞ ed either as one person, or as two (26). 
36. I am here in disagreement with R. Saldívar who reads Hungers last lines in 
terms of a deÞ nitive closure and resolution. Saldívar reads Rodriguez as a Christ-
like Þ gure leaving the last supper of familial discontent ready to be reborn as the 
published autobiographer of assimilated middle-class Mexican America (Ide-
ologies, 28). The fact that Rodriguez is the last of his brothers to live, the nostalgia 
that permeates this ending, and the in-between position which he occupies at the 
closure of the text are all textual elements which indicate Rodriguezs incredible re-
luctance to move towards assimilation. Furthermore, his subsequent works pick 
up from where he was left at the end of Hunger, and show that there is no escape 
(no Christ-like rebirth) from the in-between position he occupies. Thus, especially 
in Brown, Rodriguez comes to embrace this in-between, suspended, position by 
celebrat[ing] the browning of America (xiii). Retrospectively, it can provisionally 
be said that the disruption of a unitary vision of the subject which takes place in 
Hunger serves as a necessary step for Rodriguezs subsequent celebration of in-
betweenness and hybridity. 
37. It is interesting to note that in Brown, despite his celebration of hybridity,
Rodriguez retains his promotion of English language for minorities in the U.S. 
while, at the same time, giving to his argument a new subversive spin. In fact, 
in his last book, Rodriguez strengthens his identiÞ cation with Caliban (and the 
cannibalism that is associated with this Þ gure) since he sees in the omnivorous 
appetite of American English a de-territorializing force which is cogent with 
the hybridity (i.e., browning) he is promoting. His theoretical move is, once 
again, counterintuitive. In fact, according to Rodriguez, the devouring force in-
herent in American English does not imply a reduction of difference (minorities) 
to sameness (cultural hegemony), as advocators of bilingual education would 
claim, but its very opposite instead. While this account fails to convince me, it is 
worth noting that Rodriguez posits difference at the origins of American English. 
This involves a revision of the genealogy of the hegemonic language in the U.S. 
Namely, as he had already hinted at in Hunger (see 33), he posits the African 
slaves stealing the language, learning to read against the law as the transforming 
agents of English language into the American tongue (Brown, 31). Rodriguez, 
in Brown, proposes a counter-genealogy of the hegemonic language by deÞ ning 
it in terms of a creative encounter between two cultures where the subjugated
culture transforms the hegemonic one. Thus understood, American English be-
comes brown, impure (xi). The process of transformation initiated by African 
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slaves appropriation of the dominant language and the cultural hybridity that en-
sues serve as a paradigm for an understanding of the browning of America. This 
celebration of cultural, racial, and linguistic hybridity builds on Rodriguezs refusal 
of essentialist categories of origins which are already to be found in Hunger. 
38. Randy A. Rodríguez suggests that perhaps Rodriguezs understanding and 
use of American as a self-description is more complicated than the assimilative 
derogatory his critics would assert (411). Even though I sympathize with this 
possibility I remain skeptical. Rodriguezs use of American seems too tightly in-
tertwined with his conservative textual voice and the telos of social progress that 
pertains to it. It is true, however, that his subsequent works imply a reconceptu-
alization of the monolithic signiÞ er American in the terms indicated by Randy 
Rodríguez. 
39. The linguistic distinction I delineate following Rodriguez can be imple-
mented by Mary Douglas who, following Basil Bernstein, establishes a distinction 
between elaborated and restricted code. The latter is a code which does not 
facilitate the verbal communication of meaning . . . It is a code where changes in 
meaning are more likely to be signaled non-verbally than through changes in ver-
bal selection (Bernstein qtd. in Douglas, 45). On the other hand, the elaborated 
codes primary function is to organize thought processes, distinguish and com-
bine ideas (Douglas, 44).
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